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MONEY TALKS: PUTTING THE BITE IN 
PARTICIPATORY RIGHTS THROUGH 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 
Daniel Navisky* 
Abstract: Democratic elections are one of the foundational elements of a 
stable, healthy, and vibrant modern state. Current treaty law guarantees 
four basic participatory rights: periodic and regular elections, universal 
suffrage, secret ballots, and non-discrimination. Those rights are bol-
stered further through United Nations election monitoring and state 
practice. This Note argues that more must be done to guarantee true par-
ticipatory rights in emerging and lesser developed nations. In particular, 
it proposes attaching conditions to World Bank funding that require ad-
herence to the rights guaranteed under global and regional treaty law 
and the customary practice of states and international actors. In order to 
accomplish this goal, compliance with those conditions should be meas-
ured through United Nations monitoring reports. 
Introduction 
 “Elections do not democracy make. They are, however, the lynch-
pin of the democratic process.”1 Those were the comments of the Or-
ganization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Parliamen-
tary Assembly President and Special Coordinator for the observers of 
elections in Belarus in March 2006.2 The OSCE and its election observ-
ers criticized the election due to “harassment and arrests of opposition 
candidates, propagandistic coverage on state media and extensive ir-
regularities in the counting of ballots.”3 
 In nations with strong democratic traditions, the pendulum of 
governmental control constantly swings back and forth, temporarily 
resting in one ideological camp or the other, and often somewhere in 
                                                                                                                      
* Daniel Navisky is the Senior Executive Editor of the Boston College International & 
Comparative Law Review. 
1 Press Release, OSCE, Belarusian Election Severely Flawed Due to Arbitrary Use of 
State Power and Restrictions on Basic Rights (Mar. 20, 2006), http://www.osce.org/ 
item/18438.html. 
2 Id. 
3 C.J. Chivers & Steven Lee Meyers, Election in Belarus Did Not Meet Standards, Observers 
Say, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 2006, at A6. 
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between.4 Disenchanted voters rest easily knowing that the domestic 
legal framework affords them another opportunity in only a few short 
years to pass judgment and change course.5 While there may be calls 
for reform in the interim, the democratic system itself is fundamen-
tally the safeguard against excessive abuse.6 
 This is not so in emerging and developing nations.7 There, the 
likelihood of free and fair elections in the future is much less certain.8 
Relying on unstable domestic systems to guarantee future plebiscites is 
tenuous at best.9 And yet, those who defend the sovereign rights of na-
tions at all costs argue against international involvement in elections, 
even though they are fully aware that fair elections might not be possi-
ble.10 
 The Belarus election is illustrative. President Aleksandr G. Luka-
shenko officially won by a wide margin, garnering eighty-three percent 
of the votes.11 Like the OSCE, the United States and the European Un-
ion also denounced the elections.12 Both the United States and the 
E.U. offered only the possibility of a widened visa ban for top Belarus 
officials to address with that state’s failure to meet minimum elections 
standards, essentially leaving recourse only to internal forces within 
Belarus.13 The disputed nature of the election leaves Lukashenko with 
what the Council of Europe’s Secretary General, Terry Davis, called “a 
tainted mandate.”14 What can the Belarusian people do to rectify the 
situation? Short of a backlash on the order of the South African experi-
ence, what will international pressure accomplish? In theory, interna-
tional human rights law, based on treaty and custom, guarantees future 
                                                                                                                      
4 See Eric W. Orts, The Rule of Law in China, 34 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 43, 88–89 
(2001). 
5 See id. 
6 See id. 
7 See Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17 Yale J. 
Int’l L. 539, 540–41 (1992). 
8 See id. 
9 See id. 
10 See id. at 590–91. 
11 See Chivers and Meyers, supra note 3, at A6. 
12 See id. 
13 See id. In fact, both only decided to impose actual sanctions for “cracking down on a 
peaceful protest” rather than for the election itself. C.J. Chivers, U.S. and Europe Plan Sanc-
tions Against Belarus, N.Y. Times, March 25, 2006, at A1. 
14 Kim Murphy, As President Basks, Foes Rally; Belarusian Leader Lukashenko Declares `The 
Revolution’ Over After His Reelection. U.S. Joins Protesters in Calling for a New Vote, L.A Times, 
March 21, 2006, at A8. 
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election rights.15 But the lack of adequate enforcement measures to 
achieve those safeguards renders those rights moot.16 
 This Note argues that the best way to ensure compliance with in-
ternational requirements for democratic elections is to condition in-
ternational financial assistance for emerging and developing states on 
fulfillment of international human rights standards for free and fair 
elections. Part I reviews the history of elections and the manner in 
which governments have been chosen, including the traditional no-
tions of sovereignty that underpin broad deference to activities within 
domestic borders. 
 Part II outlines the development of binding international human 
rights law with respect to democratic elections and the specific mini-
mum requirements for free and fair elections. First, it describes treaty 
law, including the primary instrument, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), as well as regional treaties in 
Europe, the Americas, and Africa, followed by a review of the custom-
ary practice of states and international actors through election moni-
toring and individual state elections. Part II concludes with a review of 
the attachment of non-economic conditions on developing nations by 
the World Bank and the incorporation of human rights goals in those 
conditions. 
 Part III argues that in order to guarantee that developing states 
adhere to international human rights standards on participatory rights, 
the World Bank should condition funds, in part, on compliance with 
these minimum standards based on United Nations (U.N.) election 
monitoring. Part IV concludes, noting that conditioning funds in this 
manner would be a concrete move to institutionalizing free and fair 
elections in the international system. 
I. Background and History 
 According to the latest available information, over 123 countries 
can be characterized as electoral democracies.17 But this was not al-
ways the case. At the start of the twentieth century, a mere nine coun-
tries could boast such a record.18 Prior to 1948, notions of state sover-
eignty over domestic affairs precluded human rights from providing a 
                                                                                                                      
15 See infra notes 32–71 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 72–80 and accompanying text. 
17 Freedom House, Freedom in the World Survey: Electoral Democracies 2005, 
available at http://freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=205&year=2005. 
18 Fox, supra note 7, at 540. Fox notes that this low number does not even include the 
question of suffrage for women which would likely lower it even more. Id. 
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state’s population any safeguards in this area.19 Human rights were 
not incorporated into international law until the close of World War 
II as the horrors of that catastrophic period sparked the Nuremburg 
Trials, the U.N. and its ancillary bodies, and the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights.20 Thus, prior to 1948, individuals possessed no 
rights under international law, which afforded rights only to states.21 
 Traditionally, in the international system, recognition by other 
states demonstrates the legitimacy of states and their governments.22 
And, a state typically recognizes another state’s government and its 
representatives without regard to the process by which they were cho-
sen.23 Monarch, autocrat, parliament, president—each historically has 
had legitimacy, no matter the process by which they came to power.24 
The prevailing method through the nineteenth and the early twenti-
eth centuries was based primarily on de facto control—whoever con-
trolled the population and territory, and thus the government, was 
the government.25 The simplicity of this “absolutist” sovereignty sys-
tem is self-evident.26 In practice, even today states recognize “illegiti-
mate” governments (in the colloquial sense) based on the politics of 
the day, politics that only occasionally include internal factors such as 
adherence to human rights.27 
 The concept of national elections, even in its weakest form, was 
not a recurring feature internationally until the middle of the nine-
teenth century.28 “Popular” sovereignty—the idea that the legitimacy 
of a government is based on the implied or actual consent of the citi-
zenry—swirled around as a theory of domestic organization for many 
years prior to its incorporation into international law.29 The Enlight-
enment writers introduced popular legitimacy long before the rise of 
                                                                                                                      
19 Id. at 544–45. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 545. 
22 See Fox, supra note 7, at 546–47. 
23 Id. at 549. 
24 Id. at 547–49. 
25 Id. at 549–50. 
26 See id. 
27 See Fox, supra note 7, at 549–50; cf. Matthew Griffin, Accrediting Democracies: Does the 
Credentials Committee of the United Nations Promote Democracy Through Its Accreditation Process, 
and Should It?, 32 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 725, 765–66 (2000) (noting that “the Organiza-
tion of African Unity (OAU) declared at its 1999 summit in Algiers that it would no longer 
recognize governments that have come to power through undemocratic means”). 
28 Fox, supra note 7, at 546. 
29 See id. at 547, 550. 
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international human rights law.30 But early notions of popular sover-
eignty were focused primarily on the internal structure and legitimacy 
of governments rather than international standards for achieving that 
legitimacy.31 
II. Discussion of Issues 
 At present, the participation of citizens in the electoral process has 
become firmly rooted in international human rights law.32 The founda-
tion for these rights stems from two sources.33 First, global and regional 
treaty law on participatory rights binds individual state signatories.34 
Second, the pattern and practice of election monitoring through the 
U.N. and the Human Rights Committee, as requested by states, com-
bined with those treaties, creates customary international law binding 
all states.35 These two general sources of international law shape the 
contours of the specific electoral rights.36 
A. Treaty Law 
 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“Universal Declara-
tion”), adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 10, 1948, 
is the logical starting point for a discussion of treaty law on participa-
tory rights.37 While non-binding, the Universal Declaration planted the 
seeds that blossomed into many of the human rights treaties that fol-
lowed.38 Article 21 of the Declaration states: 
                                                                                                                      
30 Id. at 548. 
31 See id. at 550. 
32 See, e.g., Oren Ipp & Terence F. Hoverter, Identifying International Principles for Resolv-
ing Election Disputes, 57 Admin. L. Rev. 829, 830 (2005). 
33 Fox, supra note 7, at 570, 588. 
34 Kofi Darko Asante, Note, Election Monitoring’s Impact on the Law: Can It Be Reconciled 
with Sovereignty and Nonintervention?, 26 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 235, 276 (1994). 
35 Id. at 279–80. 
36 See infra notes 64–71 and accompanying text. 
37 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3rd 
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]; 
see Ipp & Hoverter, supra note 32, at 830 n. 2 (stating “the ICCPR expands on the universal 
principles found in the Universal Declaration”). 
38 Gregory H. Fox, Election Monitoring: The International Legal Setting, 19 Wisc. Int’l L.J. 
295, 298 (2001) (calling the Universal Declaration “the foundational document of the 
human rights regime”). Some provisions of the Universal Declaration have crystallized 
into binding law. See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 Am. 
J. Int’l L. 46, 61 (1992). For the purposes here, the provision regarding participatory 
rights has been codified in treaty law and thus the legal status of the Universal Declaration 
provision is moot. See infra notes 41–67 and accompanying text. 
490 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 30:485 
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of 
his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives. 
(2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in 
his country. (3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the 
authority of government; this will shall be expressed in peri-
odic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and 
equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equiva-
lent free voting procedures.39 
This was the first formal declaration of these rights in the international 
context.40 
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
 The principles outlined in the Universal Declaration became bind-
ing in the principal legal instrument codifying participatory rights: the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.41 Article 25 of the 
ICCPR states: 
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, with-
out any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 [regarding 
discrimination] and without unreasonable restrictions: 
 (a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly 
or through freely chosen representatives; 
 (b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elec-
tions which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall 
be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of 
the will of the electors; 
 (c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public 
service in his country.42 
                                                                                                                      
39 Universal Declaration, supra note 37, art. 21, at 75. While the Universal Declaration 
does not have the binding nature of a treaty, it is well established that it has overwhelming 
support and is so highly regarded that it has become a “customary rule of state obligation.” 
Franck, supra note 38, at 61. 
40 Fox, supra note 7, at 546. 
41 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E 95–
2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. As of April 2007, 160 nations have ratified the 
ICCPR. China is notably absent. Office of the United Nations Commission for Human 
Rights, Ratifications and Reservations: International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights (April 19, 2007), http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/ 
4.htm. 
42 ICCPR, supra note 41, art. 25. 
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These substantive rights are further bolstered by other provisions of the 
ICCPR which establish the “essential preconditions for an open elec-
toral process,” including the rights to opinion, expression, and associa-
tion that are necessary for campaigning.43 
2. Regional Treaties 
 A number of regional treaties have further advanced the principles 
articulated in the ICCPR.44 The most commonly cited instruments in-
clude the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African 
Charter),45 the American Convention on Human Rights (American 
Convention),46 the Protocol to the European Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Pro-
tocol),47 and a host of treaties through the OSCE.48 
 Each of the regional treaties provides substantive support to the 
ICCPR but is often narrower in scope.49 For example, the European 
Protocol has neither a provision guaranteeing universal suffrage nor 
does it prohibit discrimination or mention equal access to public ser-
vice.50 Article 3 merely states that the “High Contracting Parties un-
dertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, 
under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion 
of the people in the choice of a legislature.”51 Despite its limited text, 
however, the European Commission and the European Court of Hu-
man Rights “have interpreted Article 3 to provide guarantees substan-
tially similar to those contained in [the ICCPR].”52 
 The American Convention, by contrast, is largely identical to the 
ICCPR, but the peculiarities of the participatory problems in the 
Americas have led the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
                                                                                                                      
43 Id. at 18, 19, 22; Franck, supra note 38, at 61. 
44 See infra notes 45–63 and accompanying text. 
45 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217 
[hereinafter African Charter]. 
46 American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143 [herein-
after American Convention]. 
47 First Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262 (entered into 
force on May 18, 1954) [hereinafter European Protocol]. 
48 See, e.g., Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human 
Dimension of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, June 29, 1990, 29 
I.L.M. 1305 [hereinafter Copenhagen Document]. 
49 See infra notes 50–63 and accompanying text. 
50 Fox, supra note 7, at 560–64. 
51 European Protocol, supra note 47, at art. 3. 
52 Fox, supra note 7, at 560–61. 
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the principal treaty body, to interpret the rights outlined in the treaty 
within the context of wholesale violations of other human rights by 
states.53 Thus, the central concern of Article 23 of that convention, 
according to the Commission, is whether elections are “authentic.”54 
The Commission has determined that “authentic” means an election 
that takes place with “a legal and institutional structure conducive to 
election results that reflect the will of the voters.”55 
 The African Charter deviates from the ICCPR in a different way 
than its European and American counterparts.56 Article 13(1) states: 
“Every citizen shall have the right to freely participate in the govern-
ment of his country, either directly or through freely chosen represen-
tatives in accordance with the provisions of the law.”57 The African 
Charter lacks the provision guaranteeing that an electoral choice must 
reflect the free expression of the electors’ will or the opinion of the 
people, opening the door to one-party elections.58 
 Through the OSCE, many states have adopted a number of docu-
ments reconfirming their commitment to participatory rights.59 The 
Copenhagen Document, concluded on June 29, 1990, established the 
principles for the structure of all electoral systems.60 In essence, it sug-
gested that “[t]he key principles of a democratic election can be 
summed up in seven words: universal, equal, fair, secret, free, transpar-
ent, and accountable.”61 The Charter of Paris, signed only months later, 
broadly endorsed participatory rights and created an Office for Free 
Elections to implement the Copenhagen Document.62 The following 
year, OSCE helped underscore the seriousness of the rights through 
the Moscow Document, which injected popular legitimacy as a core 
value into states’ commitments, in contrast to the de facto test, by di-
                                                                                                                      
53 Id. at 565–66. 
54 Id. at 566. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 568. 
57 African Charter, supra note 45, art. 13(1). 
58 Fox, supra note 7, at 568. Professor Fox suggests that the clause alluding to “accor-
dance with the provisions of law” in the African Charter might in fact mean that Article 13 
requires no more than that which is already provided for in national constitutions, render-
ing Article 13 “entirely useless.” Id. 
59 See Ipp & Hoverter, supra note 32, at 831. 
60 Fox, supra note 7, at 569. 
61 OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Election Obser-
vation—A Decade of Monitoring Elections: The People and the Practice (2005), 
available at http://www.osce.org/item/17148.html?ch=478; see Copenhagen Document, supra 
note 48, at ¶¶ 5–8. 
62 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Nov. 21, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 190, 207 [hereinafter 
Charter of Paris]; Fox, supra note 7, at 569. 
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recting member states not to recognize usurping forces in the event of 
a coup against a duly elected government.63 
3. Synthesis of Treaty Based Participatory Rights 
 Many commentators suggest that, taken together, the Universal 
Declaration, the ICCPR, and the regional treaties evince a clear set of 
standards for free and fair elections under international human rights 
law.64 They argue that participatory rights law guarantees four basic 
components: periodic and regular elections, universal suffrage, secret 
ballots, and non-discrimination.65 The precise contours of those rights 
remain hazy.66 State practice through election monitoring provides 
the critical guidance on many of those ambiguities.67 
B. U.N. Election Monitoring 
 According to Gregory Fox, one of the principal proponents of 
international law as a source for participatory rights, election moni-
toring provides the logical rights inferred by the treaty-based stan-
dards.68 
The standards derived from [U.N.] election monitoring per-
mit the addition of the following elements of a legally suffi-
cient election to those derived solely from the human rights 
treaties: 1) citizens must have the opportunity to organize and 
join political parties, and such parties must be given equal ac-
cess to the ballot; 2) to the extent the government controls 
the media, all parties must have the opportunity to present 
their views through the media; and 3) the election must be 
overseen by an independent council or commission not tied 
to any party, faction, or individual, but whose impartiality is 
ensured both in law and practice.69 
                                                                                                                      
63 Document of the Moscow Meeting on the Human Dimension, Emphasizing Respect 
for Human Rights, Pluralistic Democracy, the Rule of Law, and Procedures for Fact-
Finding ¶ 17, Oct. 3, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1670 [hereinafter Moscow Document]; Fox, supra 
note 7, at 570. 
64 E.g., Fox, supra note 7, at 570; Ipp & Hoverter, supra note 32, at 831. 
65 E.g., Fox, supra note 7, at 570; Ipp & Hoverter, supra note 32, at 831. 
66 Fox, supra note supra note 7, at 570. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 570, 588–89 
69 Id. at 589. 
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Fox’s contention, made in 1992, before the democratization across 
Europe and other parts of the world in the 1990s, simply fills in the 
details for meeting the four basic components to a free and fair elec-
tion.70 Interestingly, the U.N. has not explicitly used the treaty provi-
sions of the ICCPR as a basis to engage in election monitoring, but 
rather has done so based on other powers and at the invitation of in-
dividual states.71 
C. The Problem of Enforcement 
 Binding or not, these norms, like much of international human 
rights law, are hollow without a means to enforce or encourage com-
pliance.72 The First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR (“Optional Pro-
tocol”), which came into force on March 23, 1976, provides for some 
enforcement.73 The Optional Protocol allows individuals to report 
violations to the Human Rights Committee, the treaty body under the 
ICCPR.74 Anyone who claims that his or her rights under the ICCPR 
have been violated and who has exhausted all domestic remedies may 
petition the Committee.75 
 While the Human Rights Committee has issued many rulings on 
individual complaints since its inception, the enforcement is weak 
based on the language of the Optional Protocol.76 Article 4 states: 
“the Committee shall bring any communications submitted to it un-
der the present Protocol to the attention of the State Party to the pre-
sent Protocol alleged to be violating any provision of the Covenant” 
and “within six months, the receiving State shall submit to the Com-
mittee written explanations or statements clarifying the matter and 
                                                                                                                      
70 See supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text. 
71 Fox, supra note 7, at 570–71. 
72 Ipp & Overter, supra note 32, at 831. 
73 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 [hereinafter Optional Protocol]. As of April 2007, 109 nations 
have ratified the Optional Protocol. Office of the United Nations Commission for 
Human Rights, Ratifications and Reservations: Optional Protocol to the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/english/ 
countries/ratification/5.htm [hereinafter Optional Protocol Ratifications]. A Second Op-
tional Protocol aimed at abolishing the death penalty was added to the treaty and came 
into force in 1991 and has only sixty parties. Office of the United Nations Commission 
on Human Rights, Ratifications and Reservations: Second Optional Protocol to 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/ 
english/countries/ratification/12.htm. 
74 Optional Protocol, supra note 73, art. 2. 
75 Id. 
76 See infra notes 77–79 and accompanying text. 
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the remedy, if any, that may have been taken by that State.”77 About 
two-thirds of the parties to the ICCPR have ratified the Optional Pro-
tocol.78 As merely a reporting and explanation procedure the Op-
tional Protocol lacks any real compliance mechanism.79 A more effec-
tive measure is needed to encourage compliance with these norms 
and money is the key to the solution.80 
D. World Bank Lending Conditions 
1. World Bank Assistance 
 The World Bank grew out of the Bretton Woods Conference that 
restructured the world financial system in 1944, and originally fo-
cused on rebuilding war-torn states after World War II.81 The Bank 
consists of two institutions, the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD) and the newer International Development 
Association (IDA), and helps finance development projects in mem-
ber states that often lack the credit required by commercial banks.82 
For developing states, financial resources from the World Bank are 
frequently the primary source of capital for critical development pro-
jects.83 Along with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World 
Bank, for most developing nations, is an indispensable part of the evo-
lution from a “lesser developed countr[y]” to the community of de-
veloped nations.84 
                                                                                                                      
77 Optional Protocol, supra note 73, art. 4. 
78 Optional Protocol Ratifications, supra note 73. Not surprisingly, the United States, 
ever skeptical about outside monitoring of domestic activity, has not ratified the Optional 
Protocol. See id. 
79 See Optional Protocol, supra note 73, art 2, 4. 
80 See, e.g., John Kifner, Palestinian Prime Minister Calls Western Aid Cutoff “Blackmail,” 
N.Y. Times, April 9, 2006, at 11. 
81 Mark E. Wadrzyk, Is It Appropriate for the World Bank to Promote Democratic Standards in 
a Borrower Country?, 17 Wis. Int’l L.J. 553, 553 (1999); Asante, supra note 34, at 256 n.138. 
82 Wadrzyk, supra note 81, at 553. The World Bank (IBRD and IDA), combined with 
the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA), and the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (IC-
SID), collectively make up the World Bank Group. Id. at 555–56. Each institution within 
the group has specific purposes but they share a collective goal of development, economic 
growth, and poverty reduction. Id. 
83 Id. at 553. 
84 See id. 
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 Financing generally comes in two forms: investment loans and 
development policy loans.85 Investment loans have a long-term focus 
(five to ten years) and finance goods, works, and services in support 
of economic and social development projects in a broad range of sec-
tors.86 Development policy loans have a short-term focus (one to 
three years), and provide quick-disbursing external financing to sup-
port policy and institutional reforms.87 These loans typically include 
an array of conditions placed upon the member state by the Bank.88 
2. Non-Economic Conditional Lending and Governance Initiatives 
 Development policy loans, formerly adjustment loans, have been 
the principal vehicle for non-economic conditionality, although both 
place conditions on the borrowing state.89 As the economic, political, 
and human rights landscape has changed over the last fifty years, so has 
the World Bank.90 The Bank’s lending practices are no longer condi-
tioned on strictly economic factors, but include a variety of policy-
focused lending based on education, the environment, governance, 
human rights, economic transformation, and private sector develop-
ment.91 The Bank has increasingly looked to “good governance” con-
siderations and analyzed aspects of a member’s governance in its loan 
decisions.92 In fact, according to a vice president and general counsel 
of the World Bank, “conditionality has thus evolved from macroeco-
nomic measures to detailed reforms affecting the public administration 
itself.”93 In this regard, the Bank prizes political stability and sound eco-
nomic management as key to healthy economic development.94 
                                                                                                                      
85 See World Bank, Financing Instruments, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/ 
EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/0,,contentMDK:20120721~menuPK:232467~pagePK:41367~piPK: 
51 533~theSitePK:40941,00.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2007). 
86 World Bank, Investment & Development Policy Lending, http://web.world- 
bank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/0,,contentMDK:20120732~menuPK:268725~ 
pagePK:41367~piPK:51533~theSitePK:40941,00.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2007). 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Wadrzyk, supra note 81, at 554, 562. Wadrzyk notes that the life span of the World 
Bank “coincides with the life span of the notion of human rights, both of which have 
grown and adjusted over these past 50 years.” Id. at 562. 
91 Id. at 554, 562. 
92 Id. at 562–63. 
93 Ibrahim Shihata, The World Bank and “Governance” Issues in Its Borrowing Members, in 
The World Bank in a Changing World: Selected Essays 53, 59 (Franziska Tschofen & 
Antonio R. Parra eds. 1991). 
94 Wadrzyk, supra note 81, at 565. 
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 In specific instances, the World Bank has expressly worked to im-
prove social conditions within member states.95 For example, funding 
to Brazil at the start of the twenty-first century was conditioned upon 
“public investment and social reforms including education and labor 
issues.”96 The 2002 Country Assistance Program Status Report for Brazil 
makes specific reference to “social and economic progress,” “improve-
ments in education,” “reforms to the labor code,” and other social pol-
icy conditions.97 In Chad and Cameroon, the Bank imposed conditions 
on governance as a prerequisite to its involvement in natural resources 
funding.98 The Bank required these states to create an advisory group, 
related to the oil projects, designed to make recommendations to both 
nations on “governance in general, the use of funds, and the engage-
ment of civil society.”99 
 Thematically, the Bank has embarked on two broad non-econ-
omic-based initiatives that ultimately benefit its mission to reduce 
poverty—public sector governance and anti-corruption—which un-
derscore the importance of effective democratic processes.100 Thus, 
the Bank’s efforts to reform public sector governance are for the pur-
pose of “building efficient and accountable public sector institu-
tions. . . . [G]ood policies are not enough . . . . [T]he Bank cannot 
afford to look the other way when a country is plagued by deeply dys-
functional public institutions that limit accountability, set perverse 
rules of the game, and are incapable of sustaining development.”101 
 Moreover, the Bank sees corruption as “among the greatest ob-
stacles to economic and social development.”102 The Bank seeks to 
combat corruption through five key elements: increasing political ac-
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countability, strengthening civil society participation, creating a com-
petitive private sector, encouraging institutional restraints on power, 
and improving public sector management.103 In support of these two 
ends—anti-corruption and public sector governance—the Bank has 
embarked on specific development projects aimed at targeting these 
problems.104 In that regard, the goals of quality governance and end-
ing corruption are the primary purposes of the projects for explicit 
economic reasons rather than prerequisites to funding.105 
III. Analysis 
A. The Solution—Money Talks 
 The problem of enforcing the participatory rights ostensibly 
guaranteed by international human rights law is not unique.106 En-
forcement of other rights under the international system also poses 
problems.107 Nor is the solution of encouraging compliance based on 
financial incentives new—it is the quintessential incentivizer.108 While 
a specific proposal to encourage compliance with minimum election 
requirements has not been suggested, one commentator has raised 
the possibility of conditions on World Bank funding in this vein: 
Although democratic reform conditionality is not currently 
practiced by the Bank, it is within the realm of possibility in 
the future. The Bank has recognized the advantages of popu-
lar participation in the design and implementation of specific 
development programs. In extreme cases, posits the Bank’s 
Legal Counsel, the Bank may see fit to require a degree of 
democratization within a Borrower country before granting a 
loan.109 
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Others have cited the Bank’s past record of pressing for political 
change in states such as Kenya and Malawi in the early 1990s through 
its consultative groups.110 
 The World Bank should make a more explicit prerequisite condi-
tion for funding based on states’ records on participatory rights.111 This 
condition must be an initial threshold requirement for funding be-
cause political participation is an essential precondition to other 
rights.112 Two scenarios are likely.113 First, and more egregious: in cases 
where elections are overturned and an incumbent regime refuses to 
yield power, the Bank’s agreements with the state require immediate 
cessation of funds.114 Admittedly, these circumstances are not likely to 
take place very often.115 Second, and less egregious: the Bank, during 
negotiations with a state, requires minimum electoral standards as a 
precondition to lending in a similar manner as other non-economic-
based conditions.116 Thus, the Bank would guage compliance based on 
the holding of periodic democratic elections by the state and enforce 
the condition in a similar manner as other conditions.117 
 The process of review naturally requires specific, identifiable, and 
reviewable information in order to make the results objective.118 That 
source of information should be the reports from the U.N. election 
monitoring missions.119 The results of elections monitored by the 
U.N. provide for specific “verifiable data that can be scrutinized.”120 
To that end, only the minimum requirements must be met by states to 
satisfy the preconditions; this would diffuse, to some extent, concerns 
that these conditions would effectively be a complete roadblock to 
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aid.121 They must hold periodic elections through secret ballots with 
universal suffrage and non-discrimination as well as the other stan-
dards outlined above.122 
 There are two principle advantages to using U.N. observers.123 
First, while the World Bank is a specialized and independent institu-
tion, it is, in fact, an agency of the U.N.124 Moreover, “[b]ecause of its 
international status, the World Bank should consider its responsibilities 
to the U.N. and rules of international law when making decisions.”125 
Indeed, the U.N. “has become extensively involved in monitoring elec-
tions and assisting Member States in their transitions to democracy. Of-
ten far more than mere ballot counters, election monitors have played 
crucial roles in the reengineering of states with limited democratic in-
stitutions and traditions.”126 Second, election monitoring reports, while 
always subject to criticism, are most authoritative, and thus most useful 
for legal precedent, when they are official documents of the U.N. 
rather than from outside observers.127 
B. Criticisms of Conditional Lending and Institutional Obstacles 
 Conditional lending has not been without controversy over the last 
ten years.128 Some commentators have argued that the World Bank fails 
to actually enforce the conditions set on development projects.129 Oth-
ers claim that conditionality “is coercive and wreaks violent conse-
quences on the hapless poor.”130 Moreover, critics contend that condi-
tions themselves cannot create sustainable reform.131 Some human 
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rights commentators even contend that some conditions may interfere 
with another human right, the right to development aid itself.132 
 A more fundamental obstacle to conditional lending based on 
overtly political considerations lies in the Articles of Agreement of the 
World Bank.133 Specifically, the Bank is prohibited from interfering in 
the politics of member states.134 Yet, as the Bank has expanded the use 
of non-economic conditionality, particularly in the areas of anti-
corruption and public sector governance, it has done so on the as-
sumption that stable, accountable, honest and transparent institutions 
breed compliance with development agreements, lead to better out-
comes, and help meet the Bank’s core mission of reducing poverty.135 
In order to overcome this concern, the Bank can either interpret hu-
man rights to be outside the Bank’s prohibition on political activity or 
amend its Articles to realign itself with human rights standards.136 Two 
other international lending institutions, the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, have either interpreted their charters more broadly or explicitly 
required multiparty democracies as lending recipients.137 
C. Differences Between the Proposed Framework and  
Traditional Conditional Lending 
 The solution proposed here is different from the conditions tradi-
tionally imposed by the Bank and thus lacks the inherent problems of 
conditionality.138 And while much has changed in conditionality in re-
cent years, criticisms still remain.139 Unlike traditional conditionality, a 
participatory rights condition would be a threshold requirement rather 
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than a project-specific condition.140 Moreover, this condition lacks the 
complexity of traditional conditions.141 Instead, the condition is based 
on simple, achievable goals.142 Further, because of the U.N.’s tradi-
tional role of technical assistance in holding elections, the member 
state will have additional support in fulfilling the condition.143 Finally, a 
participatory rights condition is policy neutral.144 That is, while democ-
ratic governance is undoubtedly a specific world view, the advancement 
of that specific goal makes no particular value judgment about accom-
plishments and policies.145 Rather, it gives a state the opportunity to 
choose its own path on any individual policy through popular sover-
eignty.146 
D. Benefits to the World Bank, Participatory Rights, and Member States 
 While one might initially ask why it makes sense to impose this 
condition through the World Bank and not the IMF.  The answer lies 
in their differing missions.147 The World Bank focuses on poverty re-
duction through growth and social change projects whereas the IMF 
is targeted toward macroeconomic concerns.148 
 Creating a threshold participatory rights condition in World 
Bank funding is good for the Bank itself in a number of specific 
ways.149 As Axel Dreher shows, “only regional autonomy and elections 
significantly and positively influence compliance rates.”150 This kind 
of concrete democratic governance condition encourages compliance 
in other conditions set by the Bank by placing the focus on the deci-
                                                                                                                      
140 Cf. World Bank, Investment & Development Policy Lending, supra note 86 
(noting the project specific nature of current conditional lending in contrast to the pro-
posed standard). 
141 See supra notes 89–105 and accompanying text. 
142 See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text. 
143 See Griffin, supra note 27, at 762–63. 
144 See Wadrzyk, supra note 81, at 574. 
145 See id. 
146 See id. 
147 David D. Driscoll, International Monetary Fund, The IMF and the World 
Bank How Do They Differ?, 1996, at 2, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ 
ft/exrp/differ/differ.htm. 
148 See id. 
149 See infra notes 150–57 and accompanying text. 
150 Waly Wane, The Theory and Practice of Conditionality: A Literature Re-
view, in Review of World Bank Conditionality 10, (World Bank: Operations and Pol-
icy Country Services ed.) (2005), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PRO- 
JECTS/Resources/40940-1114615847489/webConditionalitysept05.pdf. 
2007] Conditioning International Financial Assistance on Participatory Rights 503 
sion-making process.151 As a result, it increases transparency in the 
decision-making process.152 Transparency directly impacts the Bank’s 
mission to target corruption in member states.153 This framework 
helps advance the institutionalization of “ownership” —a key goal of 
World Bank conditional lending following criticism of the practice  
over the past ten years.154 Externally, open governmental decision-
making aids local “Civil Society Organizations” to become active par-
ticipants in the process of policy making, another Bank concern.155 
Moreover, as a check on member states, such a condition would be-
come a regular benchmark for monitoring World Bank projects.156 
Finally, open democratic processes make it easier to encourage private 
investment because investors rely on stable democratic systems to en-
sure a proper return on their investment.157 
 For participatory rights and the global world, the benefits of the 
proposed solution are innumerable.158 The proposed framework would 
incentivize the creation of a democratic culture in developing na-
tions.159 Nations that make the transition to democratically elected gov-
ernments bolster their own legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of the 
international community and their people.160 Moreover, it would en-
courage adherence to international standards of participatory rights, 
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adding weight to their binding nature from a customary law perspective 
and bolstering their importance in the international system.161 
 Finally, focusing on developing nations as opposed to other na-
tions utilizes the most likely candidates for democratic change.162 When 
nations become serious about development, they are in the perfect po-
sition for structural and institutional change.163 As the World Bank’s 
review of the role and place of conditionality in international financial 
assistance stated, “[t]urnaround cases, new governments, and crisis 
situations may provide windows of opportunity for reform.”164 Through 
its work, “the Bank seeks to strengthen the economies of borrowing 
nations so that they can graduate from reliance on Bank resources and 
meet their financial needs, on terms they can afford directly from con-
ventional sources of capital.”165 Moreover, this is a time when their 
populations are looking for legitimacy and a voice in the govern-
ment.166 Established autocracies that are not developing, for example, 
lack the internal political incentive and willingness to make change.167 
While this certainly leaves a gap in enforcement, achieving a change in 
adherence to international standards on participatory rights in states 
that do meet the criteria, still accomplishes the goals in the states that 
are most ripe for change and in a majority of states worldwide.168 
Conclusion 
 Participatory rights generally, and democratic elections specifi-
cally, have arguably become a requirement for states in the interna-
tional legal system. While adherence to international minimum stan-
dards is growing, more needs to be done to encourage compliance. 
Conditioning World Bank funding in this regard is one step toward 
further institutionalizing free and fair elections in the international 
system. The leverage that the World Bank holds is immense and can 
be put to use in a constructive way that advances its goals and benefits 
member states and the global system. 
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 The U.N. did not monitor the elections in Belarus. Perhaps that 
nation would have requested participation from the U.N. if it knew 
that its financial assistance from the World Bank was on the line, assis-
tance on the order of $190 million since its independence and over 
$22 million in active projects.169 The technical assistance provided by 
the U.N. might have averted the questionable results now boiling over 
in the region, further benefiting the people of Belarus and guarantee-
ing true popular sovereignty. 
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